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Interview with Ben Heineman
22 October 2003

Location: Home of Ben Heineman, Chicago, IL.

Present: Ben Heineman, Dr. Robert V. Remini, and Dr. Fred Beuttler

(The interview has already begun)

Ben Heineman: We had a very close relationship. It started in a peculiar way and it ended in a peculiar way. It lasted for about eighteen years.

Dr. Robert V. Remini: Well, I'm afraid that you can tell us a great deal. Tell us how you first met him. What was the circumstance?

BH: I was under Stevenson's administration. I was in the private practice of law. I was named Assistant Attorney General with no compensation because there was a great deal of counterfeiting of cigarette taxes. The governor was under a great deal of pressure from retailers who were paying taxes because of counterfeiting these taxes. He asked me to stop it. I had broad subpoena powers. I proceeded to hold what you could call a one-man investigation. I issued subpoenas to people for the Department of Revenue to see if there was any state corruption and so forth. I started at the bottom and worked up. Dick Daley had been the Director of the Department of Revenue.

One day I got a call from him because I had subpoenaed his deputy. I've forgotten the exact title. He asked me if I would come over because my office was surrounded by camera people and so forth. So I went over to see him. This was 1952. He said that he was planning to run for mayor, which he did in 1955. He did not want me to subpoena him because it would simply dirty him and his family in the headlines and so forth. At that time he was county clerk. Or was it city clerk? I think he was county clerk at that time. He then threatened me.

RVR: Oh he did (laughs)?

BH: He said that if I subpoenaed him, he would run me out of the county, or out of the city.

RVR: Wow! So you subpoenaed him (laughs)?

BH: I said to him that as long as I paid my taxes and my bills, he was not big enough to run me out of the county. I think I said, "No one is big enough to run me out (RVR laughs)." But I said, "I am not seeking any publicity or any public office. So I'm not into hurting people unnecessarily. I'll proceed with my examination of what was then your department. If I don't find anything leading to you, I will not subpoena you. But if I find anything leading to you, you will be over in my office." So we left it that way. I never did find anything involving him at all.

RVR: That was quite a beginning (laughs).

BH: So we got some indictments and stuff on other people. That was the end of it. That was how we began.

RVR: That not a terribly good beginning for a long relationship.

BH: Well, when he ran for mayor in 1955, he ran against Bob Merriam from the University of Chicago. I lived in Hyde Park. I don't if whether that time I was a trustee of the university, but I became one. I knew Bob Merriam very well. I was convinced, contrary to the news of all my friends in the university community and my wife, that Dick Daley would make a much better mayor.

RVR: Why was that? Why did you think that?

BH: I thought that he had the professionalism that Bob Merriam did not have. So I sent him a check. I've forgotten the amount, probably five thousand dollars, maybe ten, but probably five. And I got a call from him. He said that he was very appreciative because he knew all of my friends in Hyde Park and the university community were for Bob Merriam and he appreciated very much my support. Well, from that time on, he called

me. I practically never called him. There was nothing I ever wanted. I did call him once. I became the chairman of the Northwestern Railroad. We dieselized it. I asked him if he would come over and have his picture taken as the last steam engine went out of Chicago (RVR laughs). He did. I think that was one of the very few times, if not the only time, I called him. He started to call me. He asked me to have breakfast with him at the Blackstone, which was a favorite breakfast place. He started to call me two or three times a month. We'd have breakfast. We'd talk about Chicago affairs and what not. He gave me all of his telephone numbers, his car, his family room, blah, blah, blah, which I never used. But we kept meeting. We talked about politics and the things that you would expect him to talk about.

As the time passed, he then offered me the job of president of the Board of Education. A dear friend of mine, Clair Roddewig, who was also in the railroad business, was retiring. I was, at that time, chairman of the Board of Higher Education, which had all of the state universities under its dominion. I was the first chairman and was chairman for seven years. I was appointed by Governor Kerner. The mayor called me asked if I would become the president of the Chicago Board of Education. I said, "Mr. mayor, you have undoubtedly forgotten that I am the chairman of the Board of Higher Education." He said, "Ben, give it up and get down here where the action is (RVR laughs)!" And I said, "No thank you." But we kept on meeting and having breakfast.

I was very close to Lyndon Johnson, for a lot of reasons which are not even relevant here. One day I got a call from Joe Califano, who was his domestic chief of staff. He said, "Ben, the mayor has his foot on an appointment that we want to make of Chief Regional Director of HUD. Would you talk to him?" And I said, "Sure. I'll be a messenger boy." So we were at a banquet or something and we were sitting at the dais. So I walked out with him. After he became mayor, I never called him Dick. I said, "Mr. mayor, I had a call from Joe Califano who says that you have your foot on an appointment that they would like to make of Frank Fisher," the regional attorney or whatever. He said, "Oh, I don't have my foot on that at all." I said, "Well Mr. Mayor, can I tell Joe Califano that you will not object or have your friends in Congress object to his appointment?" He said, "Sure you can." So he was appointed. So, typical of the mayor, one day I got a call from him. Frank Fisher was doing something that the mayor didn't

want him to do. So the mayor called me. He said, "Ben, your friend," I had never met him in my life (RVR laughs). He said, "Your friend is doing something that I don't approve of. Please tell him to stop." I said, "Mr. mayor, I don't know the man. I've never met him." He said, "I appointed him because you asked me to," or, "I did not object to his appointment because you asked me to." I said, "Mr. mayor, I was just a messenger boy." Well anyway, this was fairly common. I thought about it a good deal afterwards.

I thought, well, in his world he was not totally wrong in doing what he did. It was not my world, but it was his world. Anyway, we continued to be friends. And in January of 1968, he asked me to come over and see him. He said he would like to give me the nomination for United States Senator from Illinois. In those days, he could do it. Today, he couldn't do it. But in those days, he could do it. I said, "I'd like a week to think about it," although I knew I wasn't going to do it. I really didn't talk to anybody except my wife, because I knew that I wasn't going to do it. When I went back to talk to him I said, "Mr. mayor, nobody downstate has heard of Ben Heineman. There's only one way that I could win, and that is to run against Everett Dirksen on the Vietnam War," which I have always been against. There was a certain amount of publicity. I said, "If I run against Senator Dirksen again, on the single issue of the Vietnam War, I'm also in effect running against the president. As you know, the president has offered me two cabinet positions."

RVR: He did?

BH: Yes. But there's no point in getting into my relationship with Lyndon Johnson. I said, "I really can't run against Dick Dirksen on that issue because it would be very disloyal to somebody, as you know, that I'm very close and has certainly been kind to me." So the mayor shrugged his shoulders. I'm sure that I wasn't the first person who said no to him. We continued. And that was in January of 1968. Then he called me one day. I always spent the summers in Northern Wisconsin. He called and said that he'd like to appoint me as the delegate to the convention. Well, there was more before that. But I'll go back to that. So I told him I would do that. I sat right behind him. I remember the big commotion. I had my own views on what he said and didn't say.

RVR: Would you share that with us?

BH: I do not think that he called the senator a kike. Now I was in back of him, in the seat directly behind. And his face was red as it got when he got angry. He was clearly angry. His neck got red. I was right there watching him. But I could hear him clearly. And I was always convinced that he never used that word in connection.

RVR: Did he use a four-letter word?

BH: He could have used a four-letter word. But he never called him a Jew, a kike, or any of those things.

RVR: The family seems to think that he used the word faker.

BH: Oh, he could have easily done that. But it wouldn't even have made enough of an impression on me to remember it. I would have remembered Jew or kike. I would probably have remembered Shiite and whatever. But I don't remember any of those. I'm sure I could hear him clearly. But if he used the faker, I'm sure I could hear him clearly.

RVR: No. But it's been reported that he used a different word.

BH: Yes. He could have. But I think I would have remembered it. A year or two earlier, I had been chairman of a number of presidential commissions involving the war on poverty, the whole black community, and so on. It went on for a year. When Martin Luther King was going to walk through Cicero or wherever, there was a religious and political business committee that was formed. The mayor asked me to be the chairman of it and preside over hearings at which Martin Luther King and a variety of other people were present, which I did. We worked out a solution with the help of friends of mine and so forth. So as I said, time passed. And in due course, we got up to his running for re-election. That was the second time, I think, that I called him. He had been ill before that. I said, "Mr. mayor, I'm going to volunteer an opinion. I don't think that you should run.

You are quite likely to die inside a four year term." You must remember, we were quite good friends by then. So I could talk to him about his death. And I was talking to him about it politically and the political consequences.

Dr. Fred W. Beuttler: Which term was this? Was this in 1971?

BH: This was his last term.

FWB: This was in 1975. Okay.

BH: I said, "I don't think that you should run. I think that it's a tremendous amount of stress. You're not in good health. You could die in the middle of your term. Without your indicating anything about who should succeed you, there could be chaos. I think that you should very clear who you want as your successor and not run again, for your family's sake, for your friend's sake, for the city's sake, etc." He gave me his Buddha look (RVR laughs). He said, "Well Ben, I value your opinion. But I'm going to run." Well, I then made what I call one of my great mistakes of judgement. My feelings weren't hurt that he didn't pay attention to me, believe me. But I was convinced that he was probably going to die in the middle of his term.

So I supported his opponent. I shouldn't have done it. I should have kept quiet and stayed out of it. I didn't know his opponent particularly, either. I'm talking about in the primary. It was a foolish thing to do because I knew it had no success and no possibility of success. But I really felt very strongly that he was going to cause a lot of trouble if he died in mid term. I still look back on that in a life full of mistakes as the biggest mistake I ever made because it was really an act of disloyalty. After our first heated meeting, we had been very good friends. I should have just sat on the sidelines and kept my mouth shut. I couldn't possibly influence the result. Anyway...

RVR: Did that end your relationship with him?

BH: Pretty much. And not only that, but when his son came on, I don't have to tell you what a close family that is.

RVR: Oh yes.

BH: I think that his children were very upset. When Rich made his first run, an unsuccessful one, I sent him a check for twenty five thousand dollars, which was really a guilt contribution. I'm sure that I had met Rich, but I certainly didn't know him. And we certainly didn't have any kind of a relationship. So I've always thought that it was incense for his father (BH and RVR laugh).

RVR: Did you say five thousand or twenty five thousand?

BH: No. I know it was twenty five thousand. That had nothing to do with Richard. I'm sure he'd be a good public servant. But I would never have sent that kind of money. I was just paying for my guilt (RVR laughs).

RVR: Did he respond?

BH: Oh yes. He said thank you. Then, Pat Brian, who is one of his close friends and advisors, and I were very good friends. After his defeat, the three of us had a number of meetings in Pat's office discussing what he should do and so forth. But that just faded away into nothing because there was no basis for a relationship. He was a generation and a half younger than me.

RVR: You were the head of the Board of Higher Education. The mayor feels that the...

BH: Pardon me?

RVR: The mayor feels that the creation of the University of Illinois at Chicago Campus was perhaps his greatest contribution to Chicago.

BH: It was.

RVR: Did you have anything to do with that? Were you involved in any way?

BH: No. We felt, long before that, that there should be a decent branch of the University of Illinois in Chicago. And as you know, there was a branch at Navy Pier and so forth. But we were not really involved in that.

RVR: And the mayor didn't even consult you?

BH: I have even forgotten what year that was. I think that I may have been gone. Because when Dick Ogilvie was elected Republican, the first thing that I did was call on him and resign. Now, I should say that I had already decided to resign if Shapiro was elected governor. Seven years is a long time. But the moment a Republican was elected, there was nothing to think about.

RVR: I see. You were consulted by the mayor on any number of different issues at different times?

BH: Well, consulted is maybe more of a word than I would use. I would say that we discussed things. Well as you saw and as I described, in connection with his running for mayor on his last term, my opinion was hardly controlling (RVR laughs). I expressed my opinion to him all through those years very candidly, because there was nothing I wanted politically. In that year, the president called me on a Sunday at home directly. He offered me H.E.W., which I turned down. Our son was a Rhodes Scholar and was in London at Oxford. He always called at ten o'clock on a Sunday morning. My wife and I would each pick up an extension. Well, the phone rang at ten o'clock or five of ten. We each grabbed an extension. It was the president (BH and RVR laugh). So my wife was listening to that conversation. He said, "I know you've turned me down. I want to discuss this with you. Please come down to Washington, sit and talk to me." Then he said something. This was

January of that year. He said, "However, I want you in thinking about it to have in mind that I will not promise you that I'm going to run for another term." I took that as a statement that he was not going to run. I'm sure there are people close to him that have heard this who know more. I turned to Natalie and I said, "He really told us that he was not going to run. You and I are going to keep that quiet until the announcement," which he did on March Thirty-first. It was that speech where he added a paragraph. Well, that's way off of your subject. I would not say that he consulted me. I would say that we were friends. We discussed issues from time to time of importance. If I would say there was a time when he consulted me, it was in connection with Martin Luther King. At that point, he made me the chairman of this political religious committee. I would say that he consulted me. And I would say I probably influenced his ultimate attitude. But that's the only time in that long relationship that I would use the word consult.

RVR: How would you describe his attitude towards the race question and towards Martin Luther King, Jr.?

BH: The mayor was a law and order person. He regarded, speaking specifically about Martin Luther King's plans, as being disruptive of law and order. So you could say that he did not view that from a civil rights standpoint. He viewed it from a mayor responsible for law and order. So he was dead set against it. The mayor was Irish, Catholic, Bridgeport, and rigid. What his private thoughts were on the subject of race, I really can't say. I can guess, but I can't say. On the other hand, he had a great sense of obligation to the city. There was no question. In our most private conversations, it came through. He recognized blacks, Asians, and Latinos at that point. They were really not an element. He recognized an obligation to be fair. And we did not spend much time on that, he and I.

I can only say that, regardless of what his internal feelings were, and I don't know any more about those than you do or probably less. And we can all guess at what they might be. Anything he said or did when I was with him, well, it's hard to put it. He certainly did not say to me anything that was derogatory about blacks. His actions, in some places, spoke for themselves. But so far as I'm concerned, he really regarded himself as a mayor of all the city. Now, I'm not telling you from anything that I know.

We've all read the papers. You've done the research. I would not say that he was totally evenhanded. But I think that internally he aspired to be evenhanded. I think that he had some built in problems that may have prevented him from being what the blacks would regard as totally evenhanded. But I think that he always thought that he was acting in the best interest of the city. But In any event, he and I didn't spend really any time talking about it.

RVR: It's been said that the expressway was purposely placed to keep the blacks...

BH: I know. I've heard that. I have no knowledge of that.

RVR: You have no knowledge of that?

BH: Not a thing. I was not involved in any way in the policy making in connection with the location of the expressway.

RVR: What about education in general?

BH: Well, he believed in it.

RVR: Yes. He was accused, very often, of giving in to the teachers whenever they threatened to strike.

BH: The union was a problem. We did talk about education in Chicago.

RVR: You did?

BH: Well, it was a field I was interested in and was active in. He was political. Now, some of us would say that maybe it was bad politics. But he was political and he recognized the influence and, in effect, the power of the teachers. So, he was political.

Sometimes people do bad things thinking that they're doing good things. And he may not have even thought about it. He may have thought about it purely politically.

RVR: Do you think that most of his attitudes towards different issues were basically political to start with? Or were there some things that were very important to him?

BH: I don't think that the mayor could shave without thinking of the political consequences (RVR laughs). I personally admired him greatly. But I think that politics was his life.

RVR: Do you think that he was a great man?

BH: I don't know how you define a great man (RVR laughs). I don't have many heroes. I'm now going to be ninety.

RVR: Are you really? That's wonderful. Congratulations!

BH: I thank you (RVR laughs). But when you get to be ninety and have lived a relatively full life, you don't end up with many heroes.

RVR: Well, as a man you had known in politics, how would you rate him?

BH: By and large, he was an excellent mayor with warts.

RVR: Can you tell me what some of those warts were?

BH: Oh, not really. Maybe they were just living in the political world. I mean, that might be a wart. But no, I can't really. I can tell you many of his virtues. He was a man who totally worked good, even if it turned out to have been given hastily. And he may have regretted it. But those are generalities. You've heard them all. I'm not anxious to be specific on those. But he was a great mayor with warts, in my opinion.

RVR: Besides being a man that really cared about the city, what were his virtues, would you say, if you don't want to talk about his warts or his failings? What were some of the things that he brought to the office that made him special?

BH: He ran the city. And many times, he ran the state. There are some people that think he elected a president, Kennedy. But those are virtues. Some of us thought that he was not always sensitive to minorities, other than how many votes and so forth. But I don't think I knew many people, including myself, that didn't have warts.

RVR: That's true of all human beings, I think.

BH: I once told him. I'm not sure that he even understood it. I think he understood it. I once told him my favorite syllogism. We were disagreeing on an issue about the elevated and taking it down. It was at breakfast, just the two of us.

RVR: You mean the Loop?

BH: Yes. He was in favor of it, as I was. He didn't think that he could do it. I told him I thought he could do it. It was a very important issue at that time. So one of my favorite syllogisms has always been, "All human beings are fallible. I'm a human being. Therefore, I'm fallible." And I told him that, in terms of his decision on that. He smiled and nodded. But I'm not sure that he thought he was really fallible.

RVR: You know, in logic, that statement "All human beings are fallible," you can't say that about all. I forget, going back to my classes in logic. But I recall that you can never. It's the major premise to say anything is all inclusive.

BH: I'm going to stand on my syllogism (RVR laughs). I have yet to meet an infallible person.

RVR: Well, that's quite true (laughs)!

BH: In a long life.

RVR: But we won't argue philosophy or logic (BH laughs). But that's interesting that he didn't feel that he could do that.

BH: No he didn't.

RVR: And you felt that he could.

BH: I felt that he could. I felt that he definitely could if he chose to exert his power to the maximum.

RVR: Why did he feel that he couldn't or wouldn't?

BH: He had a political mind. And his assessment of politics was that he couldn't. Now, I can't tell you everything that was in his mind. I want you to understand something else. I was not really a social friend of his. I didn't go to his family home. I always thought we were close friends. And I think he did until I deserted him.

RVR: But you lived in different worlds?

BH: We were entirely different worlds. So I wouldn't want you to walk away thinking that I was telling you we were social friends or personal friends of that sense, because we were not.

RVR: No. But he admired you a great deal.

BH: I would like to hope so, until I deserted him.

RVR: Yes.

BH: I heard later, not later, but more or less at the same time, that he'd said some unkind things about me. I felt, frankly, that he was probably justified. I felt that, as I told you, I regard that as the biggest mistake of judgment I ever made.

RVR: Yes. That's true.

BH: That's proving fallibility (BH and RVR laugh).

RVR: Well, how would you describe him personally?

BH: He was absolutely charming when he wanted to be, and kind. I have a very dear friend who is now sixty-two years old. He's a full professor at the University of Chicago. She came here with her husband when she was very young. She'd been a White House fellow. The mayor was very fond of her husband. He dropped dead, or died suddenly and unexpectedly. He was extraordinarily kind to the wife. He invited her and pushed her. He had absolutely nothing to gain. Except at that time, she was probably twenty-eight or thirty by that time. He gave her an important job. He helped her. He called on her. He came to the funeral home. He sat in the funeral home. And there were many instances of that, where he mentored and so on. He was, in many ways, very kind and very compassionate. He was also very tough, like threatening to run me out of the county.

RVR: (Laughs) You said you saw him in 1968 lose his temper.

BH: Yes.

RVR: You were sitting behind him.

BH: Yes.

RVR: Did you ever see him at any other time lose his temper?

BH: I never did. You must understand that ours was a one-on-one relationship. I mean, I saw him in banquets and lots of places. He invited me when Queen Elizabeth arrived in Chicago in whatever year that was, and so forth. But I did not see him with subordinates. I heard that he could lose his temper. On the other hand, he had a marvelous secretary. I mean, she was a great and really wonderful woman. But, I never saw it. Let me put it that way. I heard about it. I read it in the papers. I never personally saw it, but we were one-on-one. I told him frankly what I thought on whatever thing we were discussing. And I always thought that he welcomed it. He came back. He called me for breakfast. I never called him. Or when we broke up one breakfast, he'd say, "How about 2 weeks from now?" But I never, in effect, saw him in a decision-making mode with employees or associates. I never was present for any of that. I had no idea. I was on Eisenhower's civil affairs staff on Algiers. I never saw him lose his temper. I heard that he had the worst temper that ever existed. I never saw it. I can repeat it because I've read it all over. I can't say. I can't take an oath. Eisenhower had a terrible temper.

RVR: Intellectually, how would you rate him?

BH: That's a good question. By my standards, he was uneducated. By my standards, he was illiterate. But by his standards and his world, he was a very, very bright man. And he understood people, I think, very well. But again, I think so. It's an opinion. But you, and you, and I would say that he was an illiterate. I'm not sure that he ever read a book. I'm not sure. I can't say that he never did. But believe me, we never discussed literature. We never discussed contemporary writing. We didn't discuss anything that we think of people. But on the other hand, I regard George Bush as illiterate, too (BH and RVR laugh). So, you know, it doesn't mean anything.

RVR: It was said to me that he loved opera.

BH: I don't know that.

RVR: You don't know that. And yet you were a member, weren't you?

BH: Oh, I'm a trustee. I'm one of three life trustees of the Lyric. And I was on the executive committee. Yes, I'm associated with the opera. But we never mentioned it. We stayed on what I would call public policy issues. That's what we talked about, whether they were pure politics. But they were public policy issues. We didn't talk about culture.

RVR: How about in transportation? What did you discuss with him on that matter?

BH: Well, as I say, I discussed the elevated. I was always aware that we did not live in a perfect world. And he thought he had a keen sense of the art of the possible, which is, after all, what politics is all about. Well, that really says everything. I think that he was very much of good public transportation. But he had financial budgets and all kinds of things. When I was talking to him about taking down the elevated, he was saying to me that he could never get the total support for doing it. I can't tell you if he was calculating dollars and things that he wanted to do that he thought were more important. I can't tell you that. He would talk about the cost, but in the perspective of the city budget. He would say that it would cost too much or whatever. So I mean, I was not aware of his secret, secret to me maybe, political plans for the city, which he might have given a higher priority. He thought it was important. He did not disagree in the sense of principle, in taking the elevated down and making Wabash, etc. like Sixth Avenue in New York. He did not disagree with that in principle. But he didn't think that he could do it. I kept telling him that he could and explained why I thought so. After all, I wasn't the policymaker. Who knows, if I'd been in his position, what I would have thought?

RVR: How about the cross town expressway? Did he discuss that with you?

BH: We talked about the expressway system. It's in the toll road system and so forth. But we never talked specifically about the crosstown, no. I'm sure I would've remembered it and I don't remember it.

RVR: How about the expressways generally, then?

BH: He was very much in favor of public transportation. And he regarded the expressways as the greatest public transportation. And O'Hare was vital to him. He thought that it helped make Chicago great.

RVR: In what area would you say you made your greatest contribution to...?

BH: I'm not sure that I made any contribution. I learned from President Johnson how many people that he sought and called on for advice. He would look at you. And you would think, "Oh gosh, he picked me to advise him on this subject." You might talk to friends and find he talked to them and talked to them and talked to them. In due course, he realized that the president would be a fool to talk to one person. And the mayor, in this area, was no fool. So I don't know that I made any contribution. I really don't. And if I thought I did, I would tell you. I hope not bragging, but I would tell you. But I don't, know. I know he listened. I know he came back. I know he appointed me to things that were important to him, or would have appointed me, or did. But I also know that he probably talked to fifty people in a day and then got their opinions.

RVR: In politics, did he ask for your advice at any time about the president?

BH: Oh, he knew better than that. I'd been involved in politics. I was interested in them. I contributed money to them. I followed them carefully. But I have a feeling that I would be one of the very last people he would talk about politics to. If you mean an upcoming primary, an upcoming election, or "Oh, he should run," I can't imagine that he'd talk to me. This was because the considerations that he had would not necessarily have been my considerations. I think he understood exactly what I had to say to him or to contribute to his thinking, along with hundreds of other people.

RVR: When John Kennedy ran in 1960, the mayor supported him. But as the campaign started, there was an effort to have Adlai Stevenson run again. The mayor was asked to contribute his support.

BH: He was asked. He did not.

RVR: He refused.

BH: Of course he did. And I might add this. On that subject of the Vietnam War, which were two of the hottest political subjects, when I told him that I was against the Vietnam War on the senator business, he said to me, "So am I. And I have told the president." That kind of surprised me, because I would have thought otherwise, given his background and everything else, but he didn't. When I told him that, he said, "So am I. And I told the president."

RVR: But publicly he would never say that, because then he would be disloyal to the president. That's interesting.

BH: When you say, "Was he a great man?" I can only say, in my opinion, he was a great mayor with the wards.

RVR: That sums him up pretty well. Is there anything that you think he could have done and should have done differently, other than the ones that you've mentioned?

BH: Privately, I did not think, and this has nothing to do with the politics of it. But privately, I think that he did not do for the blacks in the way of education.

RVR: Housing?

BH: Well, housing at that time was a little different issue. The whole country has learned a lot. And I can't say that what he did that today we would never do it. We're not doing it

now. But I would never say that at that time and under those circumstances that he did it out of anything but good intentions. I'll put it that way, and political benefit. There's no way to talk about that Mayor Daley. You can talk about this Mayor Daley differently. But there's no way to talk about that Mayor Daley without trying understand the political motives that lead him to do whatever he did, except in connection with his family and friends. I personally thought that he could have done a lot more. But race was not an issue that we talked about. I don't know if he ever talked about it. Of course he did. But in terms of public transportation, when I was the chairman of Northwestern, we ran the suburban line, northwest. He and George Dement, who was very active in transportation, wanted us to permit the metro line to run over our tracks and for us not to pick up people at local stations, etc. He had George Dement be his negotiator. George and I never saw the thing the same way. So the mayor called me one day. He said, "I understand that you and George aren't getting along so well." I said, "Oh, we're getting along beautifully, perfectly (BH and RVR laugh)." He said, "Well that's not what I mean. Why don't you come over here with George and why don't we sit down and work this out?" We went over there. In half an hour to forty-five minutes we worked it out. And I should say that he was maybe tougher on George who, if I remember correctly, was his C.T.A director or something. He was tougher on George than, by any means, he was on me. He put pressure on George. So public transportation involved O'Hare. And he wanted transportation to O'Hare. And he was perfectly willing to have George and I negotiate to an impasse. But he wasn't going to have the impasse break up the transportation to O'Hare. He was going to get into it, at that point. He got into it and got transportation to O'Hare. If I've said anything that indicates I was skeptical of certain parts of the mayor, and I have, I don't want you to come away with any opinion other than I admired him greatly. Being the mayor in the City of Chicago in that time, for that many years, with the power in Chicago, in the state, in the country, in my opinion, he was absolutely honest. Now, we would not think that I mean personally honest. And you've all heard this different times from everybody. But I would not say that he had friends whom he thought were honest. But neither did the world or the newspapers think that he did. Personally, I think that he was totally honest.

RVR: He was not corrupt?

BH: No. I don't think so.

RVR: And he didn't run a corrupt machine?

BH: Well, that gets into his friends. That's a different issue. He was not above helping his children with insurance or whatever else, which I wouldn't have done. So, he was a great mayor of the wards. I can't say it any differently.

RVR: Well, talk about those friends. Do you think he knew that some of them were doing things?

BH: Yes. Absolutely.

RVR: Really?

BH: I think that in his world, where these friends worked, there was nothing that he didn't know about that was worth any importance at all.

RVR: And yet he didn't do anything to stop them?

BH: No.

RVR: But don't you think that's corrupt?

BH: I think it's a wart.

RVR: Okay.

FWB: Let's pause for a moment. Okay?

(End of video tape one)

BH: I do not expect people to be perfect. If I do, everybody's private lives, I'm sure, wouldn't be justified. And I didn't think that the mayor was perfect. I didn't think that many of my friends or myself were perfect. The question in my mind was about Lyndon Johnson, what him and other people were on balance. On balance, I think that he came out very well. With Lyndon Johnson, I was very close to him domestically. He knew I didn't approve of him. I still think, in spite of Vietnam and everything that's happened as a consequence of it, on balance, many of the acts that he passed, he lost the south to the Republicans by doing what he did and so forth. And he knew it. He knew he was going to lose the south. On balance, I think Johnson was a great man.

RVR: I quite agree.

BH: In spite of Vietnam and so forth.

RVR: It's a pity.

BH: It is a pity. He would have been one of the great, great presidents.

RVR: I think so.

BH: That's not my view of the mayor. He was a great mayor with warts. On balance, I think that the city was better off for having him than for not having him.

RVR: Have you read any of the biographies that have been written on him?

BH: Oh yes. I read by the yard. First of all, except for "The Boss," I don't really remember any of them. I read them, but I don't remember them two weeks later.

RVR: Is "The Boss" a good book?

BH: I wouldn't hesitate to discuss it. But I don't even remember it. I mean, I wouldn't remember what I would discuss.

RVR: And you didn't read the most recent one, "American Pharaoh?"

BH: No I did not. I thought they'd exhausted that subject, one way or another. I'm sure I've disappointed you, but in any event...

RVR: No, no.

BH: You don't have to say no. I also know when I'm adding anything to anybody's knowledge and when I'm not. And I've forgotten a lot of things.

RVR: I'm sure. I mean, just the fact that you say he told you that he opposed the Vietnam War and told the president, that's important to know that he did that.

BH: Well he did. He told that to me when I said that I could run against Dirksen on a single issue. And that was the only way I could run, because nobody on earth had heard of me, including the then eleven million people of Illinois. Oh, I left out something that was also typical of the mayor. He said, "Oh, I don't think that ought to be a barrier. You could establish a committee to advise you during the campaign." And I said, "Mr. mayor, I would not do anything for you, if you gave the nomination to somebody in this day and age had no opinion about Vietnam who wanted a commission to advise him about Vietnam." He just laughed on that one. But that was again, typical of the mayor. Was there trouble? Appoint a committee. But he was going to have me, a candidate, appoint a committee to tell me what I should think about Vietnam. I said, "That would not be doing you a favor." But I must say, I've always laughed about it because it was typical of the mayor. But I'm sure that he did it a thousand times, if he wanted to get something off of his desk.

FWB: That's one of the things he did with you when Martin Luther King came to town.

BH: Sure.

FWB: That was one of the ways to diffuse it very clearly. You obviously knew that was one of the things he was doing by setting up a committee.

BH: Yes I did. But, I also thought that there was a possibility of doing something for the city in that connection. Anyway, I always did laugh about that. And I also realized that it was important, important abstract, that he said to me, "I'm against it, too. And I've told it to the president." At that time, I thought that. And I would say, although it didn't do any good, he was on the side of the angels. That was not a political gesture by him. He had nothing to gain from that.

The offices you have held have been all appointed. You never ran for anything?

BH: No. I told the mayor some other things. I told him at the same time. I said, "There's another aspect to this, Mr. Mayor. You like being a public servant. My temperament and my personality is such that to have eleven million people in Illinois think that they owned me and was working for them would be absolutely abhorrent to me." No, I never ran for public office.

RVR: But he wanted you to, didn't he?

BH: Yes. He offered me the nomination. So he would have made a mistake. That would have been a mistake of judgment on his part, if I'd been willing to run against the president, so to speak.

RVR: We've asked you about him consulting you. Did you ever ask him for his advice?

BH: Never.

RVR: On any issue?

BH: We were in different worlds.

RVR: Yes. That's true.

BH: I never wanted anything. The only thing I would consult him about, that I could imagine, is if I wanted or needed something from him politically, or connection with a railroad. But I never did. And the Frank Fisher episode, which I don't remember exactly where it came in the spectrum, would have taught me something if I had thought of going to him, which I never did. If you're going to get a favor from the mayor, you're going to give him a favor (BH and RVR laugh).

BH and RVR: You owe him.

RVR: That's a politician.

BH: And I would never do that. But the answer is no, never did I consult him. As a matter of fact, I never called him, except those two times that I told you about, that I can remember. I never called him.

RVR: Did anybody ever come to you and say, "Now we know you're close to the mayor. Would you do this or that for us?"

BH: Never. Number one, people that know me well enough to come to me would know that I wouldn't do it, even if they knew that I was close to the mayor, which they didn't particularly. That's because there was no great publicity one-on-one. But in addition to

that, I think if I had asked the mayor for help with something, in spite of his doing it every day as an ordinary part of his life at having people, I think I would have disappointed him. That's because I don't think that's what he would have expected from me. I think that what he expected from me is what he got, pleasant conversation, good breakfast, nice talk, and an opinion which he put into a hopper along with a hundred other opinions. I think that's what he expected of me. And that's just what he got.

RVR: Yet you were an extraordinary figure.

BH: I don't know who else he talked to. He talked to a lot of people.

RVR: But they're not Ben Heineman.

BH: Well, thank you very much. But there were a lot of Ben Heinemans. He wanted contact with a hundred worlds. He talked to educators. He talked to businessmen. He talked to architects. He did the works, like anybody in that kind of a position, like you would do and like Mike Plummer is doing.

RVR: Does the present mayor ever call you?

BH: No. He did at the very beginning. I sent him, what was for me, a big check out of guilt, as I said. But no. He's very friendly when we see each other, which is publicly. He's extremely friendly. But no, he hasn't. I had a very dear friend about my age or a little older, who died. He told his wife that if she wanted any advice, she should come to me. They had two sons who were a generation younger. So in due course, she wrote a letter, asking me to come and have dinner with her and the boys and give advice. I said, "No, not unless the boys ask me." It's because my experience is that one generation doesn't accept advice from their father's generation after his death. So, I got another letter and I wrote her the same answer. I never heard from the boys and I didn't expect to.

FWB: How different in style and approach are the two mayors, at least from your perception? How different is the son from the father?

BH: Well, I was going to say they're as different as day and night. But I wouldn't think that was an accurate statement. I would say there's a difference in generations. Mayor Daley the first thought that the final decision was to Mayor Daley. And he expected to bring the unions along, because of other things that he could do for the unions, etc. There was the business community, who loved him, because he was very pro-business. That was Mayor Daley one. With the minorities, he gave a lot of thought to politically, but not, as I recall, on principle. I think this mayor is a generation younger. He doesn't think that he has the absolute power that his father thought he had. He doesn't think he needs the minorities and all kinds of other people. He's maybe a better politician, although you can't say that. They lived in different times. His father was one hell of a politician. So I think there's a difference. But I think it's a generational difference. We're in a different world. He can't go and offer the job of the nominee of the Democratic party to whomever he likes and expect it without doubt to be accepted. There was never a doubt in his mind or in my mind that if we agreed on it I would be the Democratic nominee. There was never a question in either of our minds. I don't think that the mayor number two has any such idea.

RVR: You mentioned the businesses like Richard J. Daley. Why?

BH: Its because they almost always found him sympathetic and understanding. They knew that he depended on unions. But they also knew that he was helpful to them.

RVR: In what ways?

BH: There was getting things built, building permits, factories, and O'Hare, which was terribly important to major businesses. It was all of those.

RVR: Taxes?

BH: I don't think so. I ran a fairly large company. And I don't think we ever thought particularly about city taxes. We had a lot of property.

RVR: How about zoning?

BH: I can't tell you that. Because if we're talking locally, the aldermen have an awful lot to do with zoning. I had a big zoning problem with the expressway group, and with Wyman, who was chairman of the expressway. The Northwestern Railroad had their biggest switching yard, Proviso. Austin wanted to cut the expressway right through the middle of it, which would have been terrible from our standpoint. So, I didn't go to the mayor. I don't know if there was anything he could do. Austin and I had a long battle, which finally detoured. There's a big curve around our Proviso yard. I think on any major businessman, and maybe smaller ones, that wanted to see the mayor could see him at the drop of a hat. I think that if the business person had a legitimate request to benefit his company, he could depend on a friendly reply. Whether anybody asked him for illegitimate things, I have no idea. But the business community liked him. That I know firsthand, not from reading newspapers. They liked him and voted for him.

RVR: Do you think that he was a financial whiz?

BH: That never even occurred to me. Well, I guess the answer to that is that it depends, I guess, on how it is defined. Did he know a lot about city budgets, county budgets, and state budgets? Yes. Did he know anything about puts, calls, securities, and God knows what? I guess no. But I don't know.

RVR: He did keep the city from bankruptcy, like Cleveland.

BH: I have no doubt that because of his background in the senate and as county clerk, you looked it up. Was I right that he was county clerk?

FWB: Yes. He was county clerk.

BH: And so on, even as mayor, I guess he knew the budget that he was concerned with, backwards and forwards. He knew a lot about municipal bonds and so on. But outside of that, I have no idea. But even there, in a way I'm totally speculating. It was nothing that he and I ever spent any time on, other than his conviction that he couldn't get the money to take the El down. And I was convinced that he could. But we'll never know who was right (BH and RVR laugh).

RVR: Do you have any questions?

FWB: Yes. I have one. Now, you were meeting with him maybe once or twice a month for most of this period, from the late fifties through the early seventies, or up until 1975.

BH: Well, I may have exaggerated that. I was away for several months. Let's say when we were both in town, we would have breakfast together once or twice a month.

FWB: Now, what percentage of that offhand, was just a political policy breakfast? Go ahead.

BH: I was just going to say. The funny thing is, I don't remember who paid for it or whether anyone paid for it (BH and RVR laugh). I have no recollection. Normally, I grab a check. And I would be very likely to grab a check. I have no recollection of ever having paid for those breakfasts, or him having paid for it. So maybe we were eating on the Blackstone (BH, RVR, and FWB laugh). Excuse me. It just occurred to me. I have no recollection of who paid for them.

FWB: (Laughs) I was never going to ask that. It just came to mind. But it could be that the Blackstone picked it up. One of the things was that it was almost exclusively public policy breakfasts.

BH: Yes.

FWB: And that's what you were focused on. What was the relationship between the national, state, and the local? What was his concern there primarily? Was almost all city policy? Or was it quite a bit involved with the state?

BH: There was no doubt in my mind. Well yes, but no. He was getting money for housing. It was all kinds of huge amounts of money from the federal government. By he, I mean the city. And the federal government, particularly if it was Democratic, depended on him to carry Illinois, which was no small matter. There was no question in my mind, in spite of that there would have been some differences. Well, talking about the present mayor, the president of the United States depends on the present mayor for a lot of things. Maybe it's not for carrying Illinois for him, but for lots of things, and vice versa. Actually, any public statements that I've heard the mayor say about the president, have been by and large either benign or certainly not offensive to him. If anything, it's been benign. So, there's a tremendous interconnection. And there's the state, of course. After all, airports have had quite a bit of controversy with the state.

FWB: Now, the mayor knew that you were very close to the Johnson administration.

BH: That he knew.

FWB: And one of the major things were the Great Society programs that funneled an enormous amount of money into the City of Chicago.

BH: That is true.

FWB: There was a big controversy within the Johnson Administration as to who got control of that money within the city. And I know how the mayor related some of the other community groups, let's say. How did he sort of express his opinion as to where these kinds of monies were going, especially the Great Society?

BH: There is no doubt in my mind from conversations that we had that he was genuinely in favor of Great Society programs. Now he also, I think, thought that they were good politics, and particularly in Chicago. But there's no doubt, in my mind, that he genuinely believed in it. Now, a lot of them affected the south, and didn't affect him. But never the less, he believed in it.

FWB: There was a push towards maximum feasible participation among community groups.

BH: You mean that they don't have it, with this mayor, or didn't have it?

FWB: No. I mean with Great Society money. There was a move in the Johnson administration to channel money away from big city mayors, like Daley, and to give it to community groups.

BH: Then?

FWB: Yes. Did Mayor Daley talk to you about this?

BH: I don't know. This is based on your interviewing Chicago community members?

FWB: Yes.

BH: I have no doubt that there was a fight over control of the money. And although I never asked him why he had his foot on Frank Fisher, and I'm sure he did, that could have been an issue that was a parallel. But I'm speculating. There's no doubt in my mind that there was a fight over the control of that money. How did they feel that it ended up, that the mayor got most of it?

FWB: Yes.

BH: That's how I would have guessed.

FWB: There's a couple things about the actual political campaign that the mayor was involved with. There was some speculation that there was a significant turn after the 1963 election against Ben Adamowski. It was the closest election that the mayor ever had. Adamowski pulled significant amounts of votes in the white ethnic wards. There was some speculation that Daley shifted away from his more progressive policies on race the race issue, being a little more progressive on race, and instead focusing much more on the white ethnic wards. Did you notice some of that in the mid sixties? Did he talk to you about this in your breakfasts?

BH: We did not really talk about politics.

FWB: It was just policy, rather than specific politics.

BH: It was policy. We did not talk about politics. And I would have loved to talk to the mayor about politics. It would have been fun and I would have learned a lot. I just thought that the mayor thought it would be a waste of time to talk to me about politics (BH and RVR laugh).

RVR: I doubt that (laughs).

BH: No. I believe it.

FWB: In some ways you represented a different wing in the Democratic Party than he did, in large part.

BH: Yes I did. Before he was mayor, when Kelly was mayor, a group of us ran somebody for state senator. He was a black man. He got all of the white precincts, the university precincts that we were working. And he lost it in the black wards, that at that time, Kelly

and Jack Garvey controlled. The greatest compliment that I had to our campaign was that Mayor Kelly and Jack Garvey came out to the precincts where we were having it to make certain that they got the black vote against this guy. He carried all of the university wards and everything. That's long ago. That's of no interest.

FWB: That was one of the few things politically that you were involved in. Most of it was policy issues, right, with the mayor?

BH: Yes. Well, I would say that cigarette tax thing with the governor was political. It was eight column headlines almost everyday in all of the Chicago papers.

FWB: So you're distinguishing policy from actual day-to-day elections. That was the political aspect, the electioneering, the mayors' races, and the aldermen's races. That you weren't involved with at all. But there were policy issues and how they affected the city.

BH: Right.

FWB: That was very close. The mayor asked your advice, or at least he listened.

BH: Well, there was an exchange.

[xxxx]

FWB: Let's go back to some of the big policy issues that you may have been involved in. In the late fifties, the mayor pushed a major redevelopment of downtown that involved a lot of the consolidation of the railways. I'm not sure. Were you closely related with the CN&W then or...?

BH: I became the chairman of the CN&W on April 1, 1956.

FWB: So you were right involved with railroad consolidation?

BH: All of it. There was all kinds of litigation. I spent my life on consolidation. I had control, at one time, of several railroads.

FWB: This involves university history. And that is working with Wayne Johnson and the attempted consolidation of the railway yards in the South Loop area. At least from your perception, how did the mayor push that? What was the mayor's vision of what the consolidated railway yards should look like? And how would that relate to the possible university sight?

BH: We talked about railroad consolidation. But the Northwestern was not really involved in that issue. We had our own consolidation issue, which was not out there. We were not there. That Illinois, Gulf Mobile and Western, etc. I think there was, and I think maybe Kansas City Southern. I don't know if they were in there. But we were not. We were in a different territory. So I can't say that I was really involved in that, with him or at all.

FWB: And he didn't coordinate the various railroads at all?

BH: I've got to say this. A lot of the things we talked about I no longer remember.

FWB: Yes. That was forty years ago.

BH: Then something will come up, and maybe I'll think of it. But I don't think that was a major issue, in our conversation.

FWB: Right. I mean, you were Northwestern Railway rather than the others.

BH: And, at that exact time I hired Wayne Johnson. We were on the board together of the Association of the American Railroads. I hired his executive vice president as my president away from him. But we remained friends. He was very unhappy. But anyway, I wasn't involved in that.

FWB: I was just wondering about some of the consolidation issues. There was another major city plan that took place also. Actually, it was in the early seventies. Were you involved in some of that and how the vision of the central city used to be? Did the mayor talk to you about that kind of policy?

BH: We sold our railroad to the employees. It became effective in 1972. The agreement was in 1970. It took two years or more to get it through the Illinois Commerce Commission, I mean the United States Commerce Commission. By then, the person who was going to run was pretty much running the railroad. And I had other companies. Although he reported to me, I hired him when he was twenty-eight years old. He ran the railroad. It was a major, major issue. He wouldn't talk to me.

FWB: So you weren't, in the late sixties and early seventies, talking too much to the mayor about specific policies that affected the railways?

BH: I wasn't talking at all to him. And I never talked to the mayor about the Northwestern Railroad, except to get him to say good-bye to the steam engine.

FWB: I have a number of questions that may be off of the Daley issue.

BH: Go ahead.

FWB: One of the things that Dr. Remini and I are working on is the history of the University of Illinois at Chicago. The Daley Project is part of that. The mayor's family has asked us to work on this. But we're also interested in the history of the university as it relates to state higher education. And you were the head of the I.B.H.E. as the board chairman.

BH: Now, just keep in mind when I became the chairman.

FWB: It was in 1962 or 1963?

BH: I became the chairman when Governor Kerner was first elected. That would have been, 1952 was Stevenson. 1956 was...?

FWB: That was Governor Stratton. Kerner was elected in 1960.

BH: That's right, then, until 1967.

FWB: Okay. So you left when Sam Shapiro came in after Kerner.

BH: No. I left when Dick Ogilvie came in.

BH and FWB: That was through 1968.

FWB: So you were there a little bit with Sam Shapiro?

BH: Well, I've always said seven years, and I'm not very sure that I'm right. It was seven years, but approximately right. It was until 1967. But I remember resigning with Dick Ogilvie and intending to resign with Sam Shapiro. So that would've been 1968, I think.

FWB: Kerner went to the bench and resigned from the governorship. Kerner was there for a short interim and lost in 1968. This was an enormous change in how Illinois organized higher education.

BH: It was enormous. There were a number of boards of higher education already. But we were surely one of the early ones. Not by any means the earliest, and not a pacesetter, but we were one of the earliest.

FWB: This was the period of the first three master plans in higher education.

BH: Right. I was very active in all of them. Are you including the master plan for medical education?

FWB: Yes. That's a separate issue.

BH: Yes. I wouldn't say that was the greatest or most important thing we did. But I would personally put that at the top.

FWB: Okay. Talk about that and how that came into being. It was a very politicized move about the University of Chicago, which it was closely related to.

BH and FWB: Southern Illinois.

BH: Which was always a problem.

FWB: There was the re-chartering of Rush.

BH: Is it still a problem?

FWB: Yes. It's still a bit of a problem. It's still one of the most expensive places on a per medical student basis in the country.

BH: Well, I can tell you what happened. Obviously, I was not equipped. So I persuaded Jim Campbell, who was then the chairman of St. Luke's Rush to become, I forget what we called it. It was whatever the head of developing the plan was. He brought with him a very bright young doctor as his staff. He did not keep coming to board meetings. He kept informing me of where they were. I would tell the board six to ten word sentences of where they were and that it was moving. Then they came up with the master plan, which we adopted. And I always thought that it was a great accomplishment, not particularly by me, but by Jim Campbell.

FWB: Now, were you still a trustee at the University of Chicago at that point?

BH: Yes. I was a life trustee.

FWB: You were a life trustee. How was the trustee...?

BH: I don't go to the meetings.

FWB: Okay, so you're not at the meetings and you're not involved on the trustee board. It's because that's when, if I remember right, there was an attempt to get some of the hotel money, if I remember right.

BH: I don't go to meetings.

FWB: You're not involved in the meetings.

BH: I haven't gone to meetings in several years. I got tired of being lectured to (RVR laughs). So if either of you go to board meetings, don't lecture them.

FWB: Don't lecture the board members. So you're not involved in the hands on with the University of Chicago Board of Trustees?

BH: Nothing.

FWB: So you didn't hear too much about the move to actually separate off, or the reasons why they were going to disaffiliate with Rush? Or were you, with the University of Chicago?

BH: With Rush?

FWB: Yes. Rush needed to be re-charter. That was one of the things that Campbell tried to do.

BH: Jim Campbell found, or developed it. We talked about Rush Medical School a great deal on a social basis. He found the charter and got the idea of the medical school. I don't know that he got it. But he pushed it.

FWB: Yes. He pushed it. That was his idea. He talked for a little while before though about a connection much closer with the University of Illinois Medical School.

BH: That is true.

FWB: Do you know of some of the relations between Campbell and some of the University of Illinois medical people?

BH: No. And I don't even know where I got the idea. I had never met Jim Campbell until I asked him to become... I don't know where I got the idea of Jim Campbell.

FWB: You mean bringing Jim Campbell in.

BH: I thought that it was a wise choice. But I don't think that it was my idea. I think that somebody suggested it to me.

FWB: It was suggested to you. That was a major change in how medical education took place throughout the state.

BH: There was no question.

FWB: And it was all pushed by Campbell, with Campbell's vision, through the I.B.H.E.

BH: That's all true.

FWB: How did Southern Illinois get involved in that?

BH: Southern Illinois was a thorn in my side for seven years. I've forgotten the name of that president.

RVR and FWB: It was Morris.

RVR: The poor man developed Alzheimer's.

BH: What's that?

RVR: The poor man developed Alzheimer's.

BH: Is he still alive?

RVR: No. He's dead.

BH: He wanted every graduate degree, every Ph. D., and every graduate school that the state could give him. And one of my jobs was to say no. While I was there, I think that we kept him on his Ph. D. program for whatever he had. I may be wrong. But my recollection is that we did not allow any more, although we certainly may have because he was very persuasive. But we also had our prejudices, I'm afraid, against Southern Illinois. I remember him as a very charming, ambitious, and piggish man.

RVR: Oh my (laughs)! Piggish!

FWB: Piggish? How so?

BH: Well, he wanted everything.

FWB: He wanted everything.

BH: But it was not for himself.

FWB: Right. It was for Southern.

BH: It was for Southern, not for himself.

FWB: Let's go back to when you came in as head of the I.B.H.E. You were the chairman of the board. Why did Kerner ask you?

BH: He asked me because of Dawn Netsch, who was his executive assistant, or the equivalent of the chief of staff. At least I've always attributed it to her. I had a medium warm relationship with him before he was governor. But we were certainly not close friends. There was no reason that he would have appointed me, or thought of me. But I think that Dawn Netsch suggested me. I helped her with certain things and we were very good friends. When I got there, there was nothing. And so, I created a board. I hired the first executive director, who was Dr. Brown, and then Lyman. The two of them served throughout my term.

FWB: Why did you hire Brown first? What were some of the reasons?

BH: I hired Brown. Now, he wasn't there very long. If I remember correctly, he had suggested a board of higher education earlier. But he had been very active in the public policy of higher education. I don't remember quite what. He was a natural person in Illinois when we were getting started to hire him. I have a feeling that he was retired or was a retired professor. I'm not positive. But I remember urging him to take it on an indefinite temporary basis. That's how I came about him. He was very well known in Illinois in education circles. Personally, I liked him. I interviewed him two or three times. That's how I came about him.

FWB: What about Glenny?

BH: Well, he had been active as I recall, in California in the California Board of Higher Education. I don't think that he was the director. I think he may have been an assistant director. We were looking for an experienced person to take on that job and I settled on him. How or why I'm not entirely clear. I think he was a good one. And I'm sure that he made waves. Maybe you or other people didn't like him. But I thought that he was very good.

FWB: A number of states are going through the same process of creating state boards and finding some ways to control or coordinate the expansion of higher education. California is one of those. Obviously, New York and Pennsylvania do it, and Illinois. Illinois is a different spot. This is my reading or interpretation of it and I wanted to ask you this. Some of it, in some ways, had to do with Lyman Glenny himself. What was his vision as he came in to shape how the expansion of higher education was going to happen in Illinois in the sixties?

BH: To the best of my knowledge, his vision was the community college, number one. I would put that on his highest priority, the community college. Number two was, I think, to cut down the University of Illinois. And number three was to keep Southern Illinois from getting bigger. That's what I'd say if I were to say what were the three things that he had in mind. Now it so happened that I disagreed with only one, and that was cutting down the University of Illinois. I thought that the university was a great place. I didn't go there. Curtailing them was not our function. We didn't give them all of the money that David Henry asked for, by any means. But nevertheless, I never felt any hostility. I think that he felt a hostility to the university. I don't know why.

FWB: You don't know why. I mean, I'm looking at it as an outsider and a historian rather than someone that's a participant.

BH: First of all, do you agree with my three priorities?

FWB: Yes. It seems very clearly that way, as the master plan developed. I wouldn't have put the community colleges as that high, as number one. I wasn't sure. He didn't articulate it as that.

BH: I prioritized them. He didn't. I gave you my assessment of his priorities. And it may be. Frankly to me, I became an ardent advocate of the community college. I'd never heard of it until he brought it to the board as something that we should be paying attention to.

FWB: That's one of the things as it related to the new Circle Campus. They just completely unanticipated it.

BH: What's that?

FWB: That's the community college and the expansion of the community college that took place. The planning for Circle Campus and for SIU Edwardsville took place without community colleges in mind. Glenny came in, and this strikes me. I'm an outsider. I'm a historian looking back into it. But Glenny came in with the expressed purpose of not creating what he was involved with in California. California has a unified system of community and state. And he didn't want that in Illinois. Is that a fair assessment of Glenny's position?

BH: Well, I can't add to what I said. He certainly wanted the community colleges. I became perhaps an even greater advocate of them than he was. It was a priority of his. But it became really, a very high priority of mine. I thought that it was a wonderful way of getting people who could not afford a four-year education into the higher education system. And we tried, I don't know how successful, to work out transfers. I assume that they've progressed a great deal in the last thirty years, since I've had nothing to do with them. Does the University of Illinois at Chicago resent them? Are they a nuisance?

FWB: No. With some of it, you have to work on the agreement of transfer and these kinds of things. And the role of the mission of the campus is different than the community colleges. There's been a little significant overlap with parts of UIC's history with some of the community colleges. But no, the resentment is not there, or anything. They have different functions. How was the I.B.H.E involved with Glenny himself in the funding mechanism of the community colleges?

BH: Well, on the community colleges I can't really speak because I think when I left, either the first one had just arrived or it was still in coming. I don't remember precisely. We had a plan for a system. But we didn't have a system.

FWB: You didn't have a system.

BH: And the way that we financed higher education was very simple. Remember, those were the days of the sixties of flush money. I would go into the governor alone. He and I would agree on a budget used for the total higher education. Usually, it was x percent increase over the prior year. Maybe that's how we did it. Then I would appear before the appropriate committee and testify. And we'd get the money and lots of it. It was that simple, stupid, uninformed, and the whole business (RVR laughs). It was just that simple. Those were years, I always have said, I left at the right time. I left when money started to get short, not because of that, but I did. When I was there, I had only to ask the governor and we got whatever. We worked out the budget fairly tightly, we thought. But they were all increases and so on.

FWB: The community colleges are generally funded outside the I.B.H.E. It's from property tax and regional tax. Did that come from Glenny or from here?

BH: I don't remember at all. I'm not sure. I would have to go back and find out when the first community college took in students.

FWB: You mean from that point.

BH: Yes. I think it was just as I was leaving or afterwards. But I may be wrong.

FWB: One of the things that Lyman Glenny is known for is this I.B.H.E. system of systems. It was a quite controversial issue, especially with the University of Illinois. Why did he come up with that and how...?

BH: I have no idea at all. I think that maybe, and maybe I'm overestimating myself. And two or three others on the board were underestimating Lyman. I've worked with the staff often enough to know that the staff very often has their own agenda. And very often, they're manipulating the principals without the principals even knowing they're being manipulated. So I've learned that over many years. I regard, at this distance, and with faulty memory undoubtedly. I regard Lyman as more of an administrator than a policymaker in the years that I was there. I may be totally wrong. He had priorities. But they were on top of the table. We knew what his priorities were. Maybe I'm giving myself and two or three others too much credit. But my recollection is that we made those policies. He didn't. Now, did he bring them to us? He certainly brought community college to me. If I were asked, I would say that he did not bring the budgets of the major universities to us and their policies. You're saying system of systems. I'm not sure that I was even into that. You see, there was a long time between when I left. Lyman was there until...

FWB: He left right after you did.

BH: Oh did he?

FWB: Yes.

BH: I thought he stayed for quite a while.

FWB: Ogilvie brought in a new individual.

BH: Oh, of course.

FWB: It was one of his own Republicans. Actually, it was associated with Circle Campus. He brought him in, who also shook up the board.

BH: Is Lyman still alive?

FWB: No. He passed away a couple of years ago.

BH: I've been totally out of touch with him.

FWB: Yes. He passed away a few years ago. He died in the early nineties. Then he went back out to California.

BH: That I knew. For a time, we exchanged Christmas cards. Even that faded away.

FWB: That's understandable. There's another innovation that took place in the sixties. I'm not sure if you were involved closely with it. But with the community colleges, then you set up senior colleges.

BH: No. I was totally out of it. I didn't even know about it.

FWB: Okay. There was Sangamon State and Governor's State. They were completely different.

BH: We would probably have opposed it, by the way. Our mindset would have been opposed to it.

FWB: Why? I'm trying to get a sense of how the I.B.H.E. functioned at the board level.

BH: I think that we would have opposed proliferation of state universities, just as a matter of principle.

FWB: Once the Circle Campus and the Edwardsville campus was there, you would expand the system within but not add additional institutions.

BH: Right. Now, that's a recollection that really hasn't been thought about.

FWB: For thirty-five years?

BH: Not for a long time, but that's my recollection. I would almost bet that I would have been opposed to it. That doesn't mean the board would have been. But I think that I would have.

FWB: How did the perception and expansion of the Circle Campus fit into the board's overall picture of hierarchy?

BH: You do remember, of course, and you know better than I do, the Navy Pier episode. So from our standpoint, we had or had had a live Chicago campus. The question was should Chicago have a branch as we thought of it of the University of Illinois? From our standpoint, not fixed from the mayor's problems, on principle it was clear to us. It was not really the principle of the Chicago campus. It was not meaningfully debated in any way that I recall. I mean, I think that we would have all agreed to it. Now, as a historian, you may find me wrong. Do you find me wrong?

FWB: Well, one of the things is not...

BH: We don't have the mayor's problems.

FWB: Right.

BH: Very clearly, he had real problems.

FWB: I think maybe you misinterpreted the question. I phrased it poorly. I don't mean the existence of the Circle Campus. That actually came in before you came in. There was quite a controversy over the location of the campus.

BH: Of course.

FWB: What I was trying to get at was the actual mission of the campus. One of the early things that some of the new faculty started pushing that had to go through the I.B.H.E. were the Ph. D. programs. That's what I was trying to get at. I knew that you were involved. I knew you weren't involved in site planning.

BH: No.

FWB: But you were involved in the approval of the Ph. D. programs for Circle Campus.

BH: We were indeed. I can't tell you specifically in answer to your question. I can tell you the bias of "my board." I can tell you the bias. The bias was against new Ph. D. programs. That was a bias that extended across the whole system. Well, I won't try to speculate in retrospect. But in retrospect we probably would have felt that you should have certain Ph. D. programs. But we were against them. The board mindset, in principle, was against adding Ph. D. programs.

FWB: Was it a desire to protect, for example, Urbana's Ph. D. program?

BH: I don't think it was protection at all. I think it was duplication, costs, and those kinds of issues. I really can say this truthfully. We had no bias in favor of the university. We wanted the University of Illinois not to moralize, cutback, or so on. It truly was not a bias. I don't think in favor of the university. We gave David Henry some pretty tough times. He appeared with his budgets and so on.

RVR: What did you think of David Dodds Henry?

BH: Well, I did not particularly like him. I mean, I did not particularly like him as a person. I don't mean as an administrator, college president, or anything. I didn't particularly like him as a person. It doesn't matter what I thought. I didn't particularly like him.

RVR: Why not?

BH: That's what I was going to volunteer (BH and RVR laugh). I didn't particularly like him because I thought he was a schemer. If you really want to know the hard word, I thought he was a schemer. I've never liked schemers.

RVR: Was it for any purpose that he had?

BH: It was not for his purpose, except for being the head. All of these, when I say these personal things, they're really involved in institutions.

FWB: Yes. That's understandable. I understand very clearly.

BH: Maybe he wanted to be, I don't know that, the president of an even greater university.

RVR: I believe that.

BH: Oh, I do too (laughs).

FWB: Well, that's a logical progression. The State of California creates the state system. Lyman Glenny is there. Clark Kirby became the head of a very unified system. The

logical next step in Illinois is that David Henry would become the head of our unified system and Urbana would be at the top.

BH: So I didn't particularly like him. I hope it didn't influence me. I don't think it did.

FWB: Are you suggesting the schemer is that he's trying to create a single system with Urbana at the top?

BH: Well, I don't mean it that specifically. I don't think that David was always straight with us. To get his agenda, I don't think that he was always truthful with us.

RVR: He was a conniver?

BH: I think so. I always thought so. I guess you could say I did have one bias. I told our staff that I wanted them to examine their budgets and their applications with extraordinary care. That was not because of hostility with the University of Illinois. It was because of an assessment of David Henry. I really didn't entirely believe that I would have taken entirely David's presentation on faith. But except for extreme care in examining his presentations, it certainly did not prejudice policy towards the University of Illinois.

RVR: Did you think that he was a good president of the university?

BH: I have no opinion. I didn't go there. I saw him only through the Board of Higher Education.

FWB: A lot of things that we've learned about the inside of the university budget at that time, Henry was not so much hands on budget, But rather, it was his provost Lyle Lanier. Did you have a lot of dealing with Lanier?

BH: Almost none. There was David and his chairman, who was a friend of mine. His name I've forgotten. He was a patent attorney in Chicago. It was his chairman.

FWB: Johnston was for a while until Johnston passed away.

BH: Pardon me?

FWB: Wayne Johnston was for a while. Then it was Clement.

BH: It was Howard Clement. Howard and I had known each other for years through the legal profession. He and David were the only people that appeared. The provost never even appeared at the meetings.

RVR: Henry would never allow anybody but himself when it came to relations with outside agencies, the mayor, the ward, whatever. He was the university.

BH: That's the way it was. He couldn't very well keep the chairman of the university board out. But I might say that Howard was very reticent. David did the talking.

FWB: So, Howard didn't speak virtually at all?

BH: No. I'm sure that they spoke to each other. But they did not speak to us. It was David.

FWB: David Henry was the one who was running it. During the time that you were...

BH: Yes. I'm speaking of a very short span as we look back.

FWB: Yes. It was seven years, which was a critical period.

BH: Seven years of forty-three years is a very short time.

RVR: Historically, too (laughs).

FWB: Now, you were involved with the University of Chicago. You were on the Board of Higher Education. You were the chairman of that board.

BH: I gave a lot of thought to whether there was any conflict. I concluded that there was no conflict. I might have concluded differently if it were a different university than the University of Chicago.

FWB: They didn't care too much about state. They didn't compete with Urbana.

BH: They didn't regard it. I concluded that. And I gave a lot of thought to that when Governor Kerner asked me. I gave a lot of thought to my connection and concluded that there was no comment.

*****END OF INTERVIEW*****